FINDINGS CONCERNING THE 2/24/96 SHOOT DOWN

1. The International Civil Aviation report published by (ICAO), and The New Yorker article, show that the United States had prior knowledge that there could be an attack by the Cuban regime on February 24, 1996. The report also describes the preparation made by U.S. agencies to document the flight of Brother to the Rescue (BTTR) on that date by using multiple radar and other facilities. (See pages 50 and 51 of the ICAO report.)

2. U.S. Customs Radar Officer, Jeffrey Houlihan has testified that on February 24, 1996 (at March Air Force Base in California) he placed the equivalent of a "911 call" to Tyndall Air Force Base, seven minutes before the first aircraft was shot-down. Tyndall Air Force Base took no action. (See pages 469 and 470 of Mr. Houlihan's testimony.)

3. The radar facilities have BTTR's telephone number to enable direct communication with its ground controller, Mr. Jorge Lares. It would have taken 2 minutes to establish communication with the planes. Furthermore, a total of 39 minutes elapsed between the time that Major Houlihan contacted Tyndall Air Force Base and the moment that the Cuban ground controller suspended their pursuit of the third BTTR aircraft. (See pages 429 and pages 430 of court testimony. FAA vs. Jose Basulto.)

4. U.S. Customs radar screens contain a line approximately 12 miles north of Cuba to be used as a trigger line for U.S. Air Force response 'in the event that Cuban Air Force MiGs cross it heading north. It was ignored on Feb. 24, 1996 (See pages 482-484.)

5. The U.S. Air Force has the capability of dispatching interceptors to respond in minutes to the area the shootdown occurred., they were taken off battle stations. (See pages 470-71.)

6. U.S. recorded, radio communications between the MiGs and their ground controllers indicating that at 3:53pm at least one MiG interceptor was in pursuit of the third BTTR aircraft on a location according to U.S. radar data of LAT 24-26'N LONG. 082-27'W or 26 miles north of parallel 24, well inside U.S controlled airspace and flying at a speed of 8 miles per minute, unescorted by U.S military Interceptors.

7. Cuban MiGs practiced for the shoot-down prior to Feb. 24. This was known by U.S. intelligence, as reported by Time magazine.

8. Richard Nuccio had expressed his feelings to a Miami Herald reporter regarding a forthcoming clash between BTTR and the Cuban authorities on the 23rd., the day before the shoot-down.

9. These individuals: Bill Richardson, working with Peter Tarnoff, Calvin Humphrey, Senior Counsel House Intelligence Committee; S. H. Armstrong, National Security Archive with ties to the National Security Council; Robert White, former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador; Richard Nuccio, and Sandy Berger, also appeared to have had knowledge of Cuba's impeding threat against BTTR's planes. See The New Yorker article "BackFire", January, 1998.